

## Semi-Annual Treasury Report 2015/16

### 1. Introduction

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's Treasury Management Code (CIPFA's TM Code) requires that authorities report on the performance of the treasury management function at least twice yearly (mid-year and at year end).

The Authority's Treasury Management Strategy for 2015/16 was approved by full Council on Thursday, 19<sup>th</sup> February 2015 which can be accessed on:

<http://minutes.tewkesbury.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=256&MId=2242&Ver=4>

The Authority has borrowed and invested substantial sums of money and is therefore exposed to financial risks including the loss of invested funds and the revenue effect of changing interest rates. This report covers treasury activity and the associated monitoring and control of risk.

### 2. External Context

As the year began, economic data was largely overshadowed by events in Greece. Markets' attention centered on the never-ending Greek issue stumbled from turmoil to crisis, running the serious risk of a disorderly exit from the Euro. The country's politicians and the representatives of the 'Troika' of its creditors - the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - barely saw eye to eye. Greece failed to make a scheduled repayment to the IMF on 30<sup>th</sup> June, in itself not a default until the IMF's Managing Director declares it so. Prime Minister Tsipras blindsided Greece's creditors by calling a referendum on 5<sup>th</sup> July on reform proposals which by then were off the table anyway. The European Central Bank froze liquidity assistance provided to Greek banks and capital controls within the country severely restricted individuals' and corporates' access to cash.

On 12<sup>th</sup> July, following a weekend European Union Summit, it was announced that the terms for a third bailout of Greece had been reached. The deal amounting to €86 billion was agreed under the terms that Greece would see tax increases, pension reforms and privatisations; the very reforms Tsipras had vowed to resist. This U-turn saw a revolt within the ruling Syriza party and on 27<sup>th</sup> August, Alexis Tsipras resigned from his post as Prime Minister of Greece after just eight months in office by calling a snap election, held on 20<sup>th</sup> September. This gamble paid off as Tsipras led his party to victory once again, although a coalition with the Independent Greeks was needed for a slim parliamentary majority. That government must now continue with the unenviable task of guiding Greece through the continuing economic crisis - the Greek saga is far from over.

The summer also saw attention shift towards China as the Shanghai composite index (representing China's main stock market), which had risen a staggering 50%+ since the beginning of 2015, dropped by 43% in less than three months with a reported \$3.2 trillion loss to investors, on the back of concerns over growth and after regulators clamped down on margin lending activity in an effort to stop investors borrowing to invest and feeding the stock market bubble. Chinese authorities intensified their intervention in the markets by halting trading in many stocks in an attempt to maintain market confidence. They surprised global markets in August as the People's Bank of China changed the way the yuan is fixed each day against the US dollar and allowed an aggressive devaluation of the currency. This sent jitters through Asian, European and US markets impacting currencies, equities, commodities, oil and metals. On 24<sup>th</sup> August, Chinese stocks suffered their

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steepest one-day fall on record, driving down other equity markets around the world and soon becoming known as another 'Black Monday'. Chinese stocks have recovered marginally since and are trading around the same level as the start of the year. Concerns remain about slowing growth and potential deflationary effects.

**UK Economy:** The economy has remained resilient over the last six months. Although economic growth slowed in Q1 2015 to 0.4%, year/year growth to March 2015 was a relatively healthy 2.7%. Q2 2015 GDP growth bounced back and was confirmed at 0.7%, with year/year growth showing slight signs of slowing, decreasing to 2.4%. GDP has now increased for ten consecutive quarters, breaking a pattern of slow and erratic growth from 2009. The annual rate for consumer price inflation (CPI) briefly turned negative in April, falling to -0.1%, before fluctuating between 0.0% and 0.1% over the next few months. In the August Quarterly Inflation Report, the Bank of England projected that GDP growth will continue around its average rate since 2013. The Bank of England's projections for inflation remained largely unchanged from the May report with them expecting inflation to gradually increase to around 2% over the next 18 months and then remain there in the near future. Further improvement in the labour market saw the ILO unemployment rate for the three months to July fall to 5.5%. In the September report, average earnings excluding bonuses for the three months to July rose 2.9% year/year.

The outcome of the UK general election, largely fought over the parties' approach to dealing with the consequences of the structural deficit and the pace of its removal, saw some very big shifts in the political landscape and put the key issue of the UK's relationship with the EU at the heart of future politics.

The US economy slowed to 0.6% in Q1 2015 due to bad weather, spending cuts by energy firms and the effects of a strong dollar. However, Q2 GDP showed a large improvement at a twice-revised 3.9% (annualised). This was largely due to a broad recovery in corporate investment alongside a stronger performance from consumer and government spending and construction and exports. With the Fed's decision on US interest rate dependent upon data, GDP is clearly supportive. However it is not as simple as that and the Fed are keen to see inflation rise alongside its headline economic growth and also its labour markets. The Committee decided not to act at its September meeting as many had been anticipating but have signalled rates rising before the end of the year.

**Market reaction:** Equity markets initially reacted positively to the pickup in the expectations of global economic conditions, but were tempered by the breakdown of creditor negotiations in Greece. China led stock market turmoil around the globe in August, with the FTSE 100 falling by around 8% overnight on 'Black Monday'. Indices have not recovered to their previous levels but some improvement has been seen. Government bond markets were quite volatile with yields rising (i.e. prices falling) initially as the risks of deflation seemingly abated. Thereafter yields fell on the outcome of the UK general election and assisted by reappraisal of deflationary factors, before rising again. Concerns around China saw bond yields dropping again through August and September. Bond markets were also distorted by the size of the European Central Bank's QE programme, so large that it created illiquidity in the very markets in which it needed to acquire these bonds, notably German government bonds (bunds) where yields were in negative territory.

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### **Local Context**

At 31/3/2015 the Authority's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes as measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) was £0.73m, while usable reserves and working capital which are the underlying resources available for investment were £22.082m.

At 31/3/2015, the Authority had £0m of borrowing and £14.395m of investments. The Authority is currently debt free, and its capital expenditure plans do not currently imply any need to borrow over the forecast period. Investments are forecast to fall to £9.028m as capital receipts are used to finance capital expenditure and reserves are used to finance the revenue budget.

### **Borrowing Strategy**

At 30/9/2015 the Authority held £2m of loans, (an increase of £2m on 31/3/2015), borrowed solely for cash flow purposes. This loan will be paid back on 08/10/2015.

The Authority does not expect to borrow to fund capital activities in 2015/16.

### **Investment Activity**

The Authority holds invested funds, representing income received in advance of expenditure plus balances and reserves held. Cashflow forecasts indicated that during 2015/16 the Authority's investment balances would range between £15.5 and £9.028 million.

The Guidance on Local Government Investments in England gives priority to security and liquidity and the Authority's aim is to achieve a yield commensurate with these principles.

Semi-Annual Treasury Report 2015/16Investment Activity in 2015/16

Investments	Balance on 01/04/2015 £m	Investments Made £m	Maturities/ Investments Sold £m	Balance on 30/09/2015 £m	Avg Rate/Yield (%)
Short term Investments (call accounts, deposits) - Banks and Building Societies with ratings of A- or higher - Local Authorities	11.5	12.835	18.335	6.0	1.20
Long term Investments - Banks and Building Societies with ratings of A+ or higher - Local Authorities	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
UK Government: - DMADF - Treasury Bills - Gilts	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Money Market Funds	1.365	30.892	27.792	4.465	0.44
Other Pooled Funds (VNAV funds)	1.5	2.0	0.0	3.5	0.72
Investments with Registered Providers of Social Housing rated BBB- or higher	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
- Bonds issued by Multilateral Development Banks - Covered Bonds - Corporate Bonds	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
Financial Institutions without credit ratings	1.0	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.52
Other organisations (e.g. loans to small businesses)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	N/A
<b>TOTAL INVESTMENTS</b>	15.365	46.227	47.127	14.465	0.83
Increase/ (Decrease) in Investments £m				<b>-0.9</b>	

Security of capital has remained the Authority's main investment objective. This has been maintained by following the Authority's counterparty policy as set out in its Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2015/16.

Counterparty credit quality was assessed and monitored with reference to credit ratings (the Authority's minimum long-term counterparty rating is A- across rating agencies Fitch, S&P and Moody's); credit default swap prices, financial statements, information on potential government support and reports in the quality financial press.

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Given the increasing risk and continued low returns from short-term unsecured bank investments, and having estimated that £2m is available for longer-term investment, the Authority diversified further into more secure and/or higher yielding asset classes such as pooled funds which have the advantage of diversifying investment risks without the need to own and manage the underlying investments, coupled professional fund management.

### Credit Risk

Counterparty credit quality as measured by credit ratings is summarised below:

Date	Value Weighted Average - Credit Risk Score	Value Weighted Average - Credit Rating	Time Weighted Average - Credit Risk Score	Time Weighted Average - Credit Rating
31/03/2015	5.57	A	5.87	A
30/06/2015	5.17	A+	5.02	A+
30/09/2015	4.90	A+	5.38	A+

#### Scoring:

-Value weighted average reflects the credit quality of investments according to the size of the deposit

-Time weighted average reflects the credit quality of investments according to the maturity of the deposit

-AAA = highest credit quality = 1

-D = lowest credit quality = 26

-Aim = A- or higher credit rating, with a score of 7 or lower, to reflect current investment approach with main focus on security

### Counterparty Update

All three credit ratings agencies have reviewed their ratings in the six months to reflect the loss of government support for most financial institutions and the potential for varying loss given defaults as a result of new bail-in regimes in many countries. Despite reductions in government support many institutions have seen upgrades due to an improvement in their underlying strength and an assessment that that the level of loss given default is low.

Fitch reviewed the credit ratings of multiple institutions in May. Most UK banks had their support rating revised from 1 (denoting an extremely high probability of support) to 5 (denoting external support cannot be relied upon). This resulted in the downgrade of the long-term ratings of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) to BBB+ from A, Deutsche Bank to A from A+, Bank Nederlandse Gemeeten to AA+ from AAA and ING to A from A+. JP Morgan Chase and the Lloyds Banking Group however both received one notch upgrades.

Moody's concluded its review in June and upgraded the long-term ratings of Close Brothers, Standard Chartered Bank, ING Bank, Goldman Sachs International, HSBC, RBS, Coventry Building Society, Leeds Building Society, Nationwide Building Society, Svenska Handelsbanken and Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen.

S&P reviewed UK and German banks in June downgrading Barclays' long-term rating to A- from A, RBS to BBB+ from A- and Deutsche Bank to BBB+ from A.

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At the end of July, the council's treasury advisors Arlingclose advised an extension of recommended durations for unsecured investments in certain UK and European institutions following improvements in the global economic situation and the receding threat of another Eurozone crisis. A similar extension was advised for some non-European banks in September, with the Danish Danske Bank being added as a new recommended counterparty and certain non-rated UK building societies also being extended.

### **Budgeted Income and Outturn**

The UK Bank Rate has been maintained at 0.5% since March 2009. Short-term money market rates have remained at relatively low levels (see Table 1 in Appendix 1). New deposits were made at an average rate of 0.66%. Investments in Money Market Funds generated an average rate of 0.45%.

The Authority's budgeted investment income for the year is estimated at £188,000. The Authority anticipates an investment outturn of £115,000 for the whole year. This is in line with expected levels of income following a series of refunds for business rates that have depleted the council's investment balances. An equalisation reserve has been established to cover the losses on this income stream.

### **Compliance with Prudential Indicators**

The Authority confirms compliance with its Prudential Indicators for 2015/16, which were set in February 2015 as part of the Authority's Treasury Management Strategy Statement.

### **Treasury Management Indicators**

The Authority measures and manages its exposures to treasury management risks using the following indicators.

**Interest Rate Exposures:** This indicator is set to control the Authority's exposure to interest rate risk. The upper limits on fixed and variable rate interest rate exposures, expressed as the amount of net principal borrowed will be:

	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Upper limit on fixed interest rate exposure	£10m	£10m	£10m
Actual	£0m		
Upper limit on variable interest rate exposure	£0m	£0m	£0m
Actual	£0m		

Fixed rate investments and borrowings are those where the rate of interest is fixed for the whole financial year. Instruments that mature during the financial year are classed as variable rate.

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**Maturity Structure of Borrowing:** This indicator is set to control the Authority's exposure to refinancing risk. The upper and lower limits on the maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing will be:

	Upper	Lower
Under 12 months	100%	0%
12 months and within 24 months	100%	0%
24 months and within 5 years	100%	0%
5 years and within 10 years	100%	0%
10 years and above	100%	0%

Time periods start on the first day of each financial year. The maturity date of borrowing is the earliest date on which the lender can demand repayment.

**Principal Sums Invested for Periods Longer than 364 days:** The purpose of this indicator is to control the Authority's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments. The limits on the total principal sum invested to final maturities beyond the period end will be:

	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	£4m	£3m	£2m
Actual	£0m	£0m	£0m

**Other Prudential Indicators**

The following three prudential indicators are relevant to the treasury function as they concern limits on borrowing and the adoption of the CIPFA Treasury Management Code.

**Operational Boundary for External Debt:** The operational boundary is based on the Authority's estimate of most likely, i.e. prudent, but not worst case scenario for external debt.

<i>Operational Boundary</i>	2014/15 £m	2015/16 £m	2016/17 £m	2017/18 £m
<i>Borrowing</i>	2.000	2.000	5.000	5.000
<i>Other long-term liabilities</i>	0	0	0	0
<b><i>Total Debt</i></b>	<b>2.000</b>	<b>2.000</b>	<b>5.000</b>	<b>5.000</b>

**Authorised Limit for External Debt:** The authorised limit is the affordable borrowing limit determined in compliance with the Local Government Act 2003. It is the maximum amount of debt that the Authority can legally owe. The authorised limit provides headroom over and above the operational boundary for unusual cash movements.

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Authorised Limit	2014/15 £m	2015/16 £m	2016/17 £m	2017/18 £m
Borrowing	5.000	5.000	7.500	10.000
Other long-term liabilities	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Debt</b>	<b>5.000</b>	<b>5.000</b>	<b>7.500</b>	<b>10.00</b>

**Adoption of the CIPFA Treasury Management Code:** The Authority adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's *Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice 2011 Edition* in February 2012.

Investment Training

The needs of the Authority's treasury management staff for training in investment management are assessed as part of the staff appraisal process, and additionally when the responsibilities of individual members of staff change. Staffs regularly attend training courses, seminars and conferences provided by Arlingclose and CIPFA.

Outlook for Q3 and Q4 2015/16

Arlingclose's expectation for the first rise in the Bank Rate (base rate) remains the second calendar quarter of 2016. The pace of interest rate rises will be gradual and the extent of rises limited. The appropriate level for Bank Rate for the post-crisis UK economy is likely to be lower than the previous norm. We would suggest this is between 2.0% and 3.0%. There is also sufficient momentum in the US economy for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates in 2015, although risks of issues from China could possibly push this back.

The weak global environment and resulting low inflation expectations are likely to dampen long term interest rates. We project gilt yields will follow a shallow upward path in the medium term, with continuing concerns about the Eurozone, and other geo-political events, weighing on risk appetite, while inflation expectations remain subdued. The uncertainties surrounding the timing of UK and US interest rate rises, and the Chinese stock market-led turmoil, are likely to prompt short term volatility in gilt yields.

	Sep-15	Dec-15	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Average
Official Bank Rate														
Upside risk			0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.32
Arlingclose Central Case	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.08
Downside risk				-0.25	-0.25	-0.50	-0.50	-0.75	-0.75	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	-0.70



Semi-Annual Treasury Report 2015/16**Money Market Data and PWLB Rates**

The average, low and high rates correspond to the rates during the financial year rather than those in the tables below.


Please note that the PWLB rates below are Standard Rates. Authorities eligible for the Certainty Rate can borrow at a 0.20% reduction.

**Table 1: Bank Rate, Money Market Rates**

Date	Bank Rate	O/N LIBID	7-day LIBID	1-month LIBID	3-month LIBID	6-month LIBID	12-month LIBID	2-yr SWAP Bid	3-yr SWAP Bid	5-yr SWAP Bid
01/04/2015	0.50	0.35	0.46	0.43	0.51	0.76	0.97	0.87	1.05	1.32
30/04/2015	0.50	0.35	0.48	0.43	0.52	0.74	0.98	1.00	1.21	1.51
31/05/2015	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.43	0.52	0.75	0.98	0.97	1.18	1.49
30/06/2015	0.50	0.35	0.45	0.43	0.52	0.79	0.99	1.09	1.35	1.68
31/07/2015	0.50	0.32	0.43	0.43	0.53	0.79	1.01	1.10	1.33	1.66
31/08/2015	0.50	0.42	0.40	0.43	0.54	0.82	1.02	1.03	1.24	1.61
30/09/2015	0.50	0.37	0.41	0.43	0.54	0.74	1.00	0.93	1.11	1.41
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.46</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.76</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>1.03</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>1.58</b>
<b>Maximum</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.65</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>1.02</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>1.44</b>	<b>1.82</b>
<b>Minimum</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.97</b>	<b>0.87</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>1.29</b>
<b>Spread</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.53</b>

**Table 2: PWLB Borrowing Rates - Fixed Rate, Maturity Loans**

Change Date	Notice No	1 year	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/04/2015	128/15	1.32	2.07	2.66	3.21	3.34	3.30	3.28
30/04/2015	166/15	1.41	2.27	2.90	3.44	3.55	3.50	3.48
29/05/2015	204/15	1.44	2.26	2.90	3.44	3.54	3.48	3.45
30/06/2015	248/15	1.48	2.44	3.13	3.65	3.72	3.64	3.60
31/07/2015	294/15	1.54	2.45	3.07	3.56	3.62	3.54	3.49
28/08/2015	334/15	1.47	2.30	2.92	3.47	3.54	3.44	3.40
30/09/2015	379/15	1.44	2.19	2.79	3.42	3.50	3.42	3.39
	<b>Low</b>	1.31	2.02	2.60	3.16	3.28	3.23	3.21
	<b>Average</b>	1.46	2.32	2.96	3.51	3.59	3.52	3.49
	<b>High</b>	1.55	2.55	3.26	3.79	3.87	3.80	3.78

Semi-Annual Treasury Report 2015/16**Table 3: PWLB Borrowing Rates - Fixed Rate, Equal Instalment of Principal (EIP) Loans**

Change Date	Notice No	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/04/2014	127/15	1.63	2.11	2.68	3.00	3.22	3.32
30/04/2014	166/15	1.79	2.31	2.92	3.24	3.45	3.54
29/05/2014	204/15	1.78	2.30	2.93	3.26	3.45	3.53
30/06/2014	248/15	1.90	2.49	3.15	3.47	3.65	3.72
31/07/2014	294/15	1.96	2.50	3.09	3.39	3.57	3.63
28/08/2014	334/15	1.83	2.34	2.94	3.27	3.48	3.55
30/09/2014	379/15	1.76	2.23	2.82	3.19	3.43	3.51
	<b>Low</b>	1.60	2.06	2.62	2.94	3.16	3.26
	<b>Average</b>	1.84	2.37	2.99	3.31	3.51	3.59
	<b>High</b>	1.99	2.60	3.28	3.61	3.79	3.87


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Table 4: PWLB Variable Rates

	1-M Rate	3-M Rate	6-M Rate	1-M Rate	3-M Rate	6-M Rate
	Pre-CSR	Pre-CSR	Pre-CSR	Post-CSR	Post-CSR	Post-CSR
01/04/2015	0.62	0.63	0.66	1.52	1.53	1.56
30/04/2015	0.62	0.64	0.67	1.52	1.54	1.57
29/05/2015	0.62	0.65	0.68	1.52	1.55	1.58
30/06/2015	0.62	0.66	0.70	1.52	1.56	1.60
31/07/2015	0.62	0.66	0.72	1.52	1.56	1.62
28/08/2015	0.62	0.66	0.70	1.52	1.56	1.60
30/09/2015	0.66	0.67	0.76	1.56	1.57	1.66
<b>Low</b>	0.62	0.61	0.66	1.52	1.51	1.56
<b>Average</b>	0.63	0.65	0.70	1.53	1.55	1.60
<b>High</b>	0.66	0.69	0.78	1.56	1.59	1.68